FPI Analysis: Moving Beyond the U.S.-Russian “Reset”

Foreign Policy Initiative

In a surprise development, Russian voters in last weekend’s parliamentary elections dealt Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s political machine a stunning blow. Putin’s United Russia party, which has dominated the country’s politics for over a decade, lost 77 seats in the Russian State Duma, retaining only a slim majority of 238 seats in the 450-member lower house.

The outcome was all the more astonishing given widespread allegations of ballot-box stuffing, harassment of election monitors, and other irregularities aimed at boosting United Russia’s performance at the polls. As Heidi Tagliavini, head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election observation mission, put it: “To me, this election was like a game in which only some players are allowed to compete.” One wonders how the United Russia party would have fared had the parliamentary election been truly free, fair, and open to competition.

Subsequent pro-reform protests in Russia—along with the brief detainment of Kremlin critic, former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, and other opposition leaders who were barred from running in the polls—suggest that the Russian people are now showing increased skepticism towards the country’s current rulers. It’s high time for the Obama administration to do the same, especially when it comes to the so-called U.S.-Russian “reset”.

The Bitter Fruits of the “Reset”

Since 2009, President Obama has sought to “reset” relations with the Russian Federation, in the hopes of moving the two countries away from rivalry and towards an amicable partnership. To accomplish this, however, concessions were made to the Kremlin on controversial issues. For example:

In September 2009, the Obama administration scrapped President Bush’s approach to deploying U.S.-NATO missile defense in Europe. In an announcement that caught by surprise European allies, President Obama pointedly emphasized that his revised plans for missile defense—which focus only on countering short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats emanating from the Middle East—posed no threat to Russia and its numerically-large nuclear arsenal.

In December 2010, the White House pushed through Congress a controversial agreement to permit U.S.-Russian civil nuclear trade that had stalled during the Bush administration due to Russia’s assistance to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and Russia’s August 2008 conflict with Georgia. Indeed, when President Obama submitted the agreement for congressional approval, he declared that “the situation in Georgia need no longer be considered an obstacle”.

In December 2010, the Obama administration overcame Republican objections to get Senate approval of the New START Treaty, the sequel to the 1992 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that sets new numerical limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.

The White House is working to advance Russia’s bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO)—again despite Russia’s continuing occupation of two provinces in Georgia.

In return for these concessions, the White House wagered that the Kremlin would cooperate more closely on efforts to halt Iran’s steady march to nuclear weapons capability, and other key challenges to U.S. foreign policy. Recent developments, however, suggest that the U.S.-Russian reset is, on balance, failing.

On November 23, 2011, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev increased bilateral tensions when he declared that U.S.-Russian negotiations on missile defense cooperation had failed. Moreover, he provocatively announced that Russia is putting its early-warning radar sites on combat alert; deploying short-range offensive missiles closer to Europe; and working to field new nuclear and conventional weapon systems expressly designed to “take out any part of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe.” Medvedev has also threatened to withdraw Russia from the New START Treaty “[i]f the situation continues to develop not to Russia’s favour.”

In late November 2011, Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin reportedly suggested that Moscow, in response to disagreements over missile defense, may curtail NATO’s flights over Russian territory to supply U.S. and allied troops involved in that conflict. In a July 2009 press conference, President Obama had characterized Russia’s agreement to “allow the transit of lethal military equipment through Russia to Afghanistan” as “a substantial contribution by Russia to our international effort” that “will save the United States time and resources in giving our troops the support that they need.” Russian officials have also suggested that they may boycott the much-anticipated NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012.

The Obama administration has now apparently given up on a four-year effort to get Russia to rejoin the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)—a multilateral pact from the 1990s that limits the number of tanks, combat aircraft and helicopters, and heavy artillery units that are deployed or stored between Russia’s Ural Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. In what observers see as “retaliation for Russia’s complete disregard for the CFE treaty since 2007,” the State Department announced on November 22, 2011, that the United States will halt sharing data with the Russians under that pact.

The expected return of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin—who is seeking to reclaim the presidency next year—is widely viewed as a potential blow not only to better bilateral relations with the United States, but also to efforts to promote more political reform within Russia. Indeed, in a speech before the United Russia party’s convention on November 28, 2011, Putin foreshadowed the return of his illiberal “sovereign democracy” style of governance, blaming Russia’s democratic opposition—which is now largely suppressed—for the country’s domestic turmoil in the 1990s.

Russian diplomats in the U.N. Security Council have continually blocked meaningful measures aimed at stopping Iran’s march to nuclear weapons capability, sanctioning the Syrian government for its violation of international nuclear obligations, and halting the slaughter of Syrian civilians by the Assad regime.

Moving Beyond the “Reset”

As President Obama formulates his response to these problematic Russian developments, he should resist the temptation to dismiss them as merely international grandstanding or posturing for domestic audiences. Instead, these provocations are indicative of the deep-seated worldview of the Kremlin’s current occupants that is all-too-often antagonistic towards the United States and the West. In moving beyond theU.S.-Russian “reset,” the Obama administration should pursue a sober and sustainable posture towards the Russians. In particular:

Move Forward with U.S.-NATO Missile Defense. The White House should not give into Russian brinksmanship on missile defense. Rather, it should stay the course on its plans for missile defense in Europe, especially given Russia’s unwillingness to support strong measures to halt Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons capability and missile delivery systems.

Support U.S. Allies in Central Europe. The Obama administration should do more to assist our allies in Central Europe like Georgia—especially through arms sales for territorial self-defense, which have not occurred since the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict. Key allies in Central Europe have stood with the United States in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, “punching far above their weights” in terms of troop deployments. They deserve greater diplomatic respect and attention, and stronger reassurance from Washington.

Promote Human Rights and Civil Society in Russia. First, Congress should quickly pass—and the President should sign into law—the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011 (S. 1039), named after the anti-corruption lawyer who died after being tortured in a Russian prison two years ago. Introduced by Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), the legislationwould authorize the Executive Branch to impose travel bans on those determined to be responsible for Magnitsky’s death, or other “extrajudicial killings, torture, or other human rights violations committed against individuals seeking to promote human rights or to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of the government of the Russian Federation.”

The Magnitsky Act, which 25 Senators have co-sponsored so far, would also impose related financial sanctions, if the Treasury Secretary determines that money laundering was involved in such human rights violations in Russia. Congressman James McGovern (D-MA) had earlier introduced similar legislation in the House of Representatives.

Second, the Obama administration should press Russia to adhere to its international commitments regarding free and fair elections and the protection of civil and political rights. Diminished support for the ruling party in Sunday’s Duma elections, and the reaction of ordinary Russians to fraudulent practices—including unexpectedly large protest marches—reveals support for democracy among a population often regarded as apathetic. The United States should speak up in support of Russians’ freedoms of expression, association, and speech, and against impunity for official corruption and brutality. As FPI Executive Director Jamie Fly and Policy Director Robert Zarate wrote in National Review Online: “The United States must make clear that Russia’s authoritarianism is unacceptable. Every beating and killing of a journalist, every mass arrest at an opposition rally, every rigged election, and every thuggish public statement made by a member of the regime must be roundly and repeatedly condemned by the U.S. government at the highest levels.”

Third, the State Department should work closely with Congress to reprogram existing funds for Russian democracy and enterprise promotion that are currently sitting in limbo. In an era of fiscal austerity, critics on Capitol Hill cite the poor “strategic return on investment” of the roughly $1.5 billion spent by Washington on such efforts over the last decade. Indeed, lawmakers are unlikely to be persuaded if the administration simply takes an “old wine in new bottles” approach to reprogramming these funds.

However, there may be a way forward—especially if the State Department is willing to go back to the drawing board on existing proposals, and actively consult with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee to fashion a bold, imaginative, credible, and demonstrably cost-effective approach to promoting democracy, enterprise, and civil society in Russia. If the use of American “smart power” in Russia is to be more than a platitude, then Foggy Bottom will have to partner more effectively with Capitol Hill.

Conclusion

It is appropriate for Washington to cooperate with Moscow on issues that serve the interests of both nations. But it is unreasonable and counterproductive to expect that substantial progress will be made so long as Washington and Moscow remain at loggerheads over a myriad of important international issues like Iran’s march to nuclear weapons capability. U.S. actions did not cause last decade’s breach between East and West. Nor will they alone be able to repair it in this decade. The United States, however, can mitigate the impact of the gulf, and advance its own policies and interests without kowtowing to the Kremlin. займ на карту срочно без отказа микрозаймы онлайн https://zp-pdl.com/how-to-get-fast-payday-loan-online.php https://zp-pdl.com/emergency-payday-loans.php займ на карту без отказов круглосуточно