People tire of democratic facade in Putin’s Russia

The Guardian – Prince Edward Island

For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russians have swarmed the streets in the tens of thousands across the country in protest of the Dec. 4th parliamentary elections, in which Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party maintained its majority of seats in disputed fashion.

Outraged by the extensive allegations and reportings of electoral manipulation, Russians have called for new, transparent elections and even for the resignation of the prime minister himself. Yet, there is more to this sudden public outburst than meets the eye. Rather, it is a manifestation of general dissatisfaction with the state of democracy and corruption in the Russian Federation.

Twenty years after the fall of communism, little in Russia has changed. Political power and financial wealth remain concentrated in the hands of an inner circle of elites who dominate all facets of society. To the frustration of the Russian people, the development of a multi-party democracy, which once seemed genuine in the 1990s, has given way to the resurgence of authoritarianism and elitism under Mr. Putin and current President Dmitri Medvedev.

At the heart of the matter is Russia’s ‘superpresidential’ political system. Contrary to our prime minister, the Russian president is extremely powerful. He has the capacity to issue decrees which cannot be repealed by the legislature, and he is practically impossible to impeach. Moreover, the president is responsible for the appointments of all positions to the executive and bureaucratic levels of government, including the various departmental ministers.

The result is that Russia’s ‘superpresidential’ system has contributed to the widespread practice of patronage, corruption and to the development of a personality cult, where loyalty to Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev is regarded as the channel to promotion and power.

Consequentially, ‘superpresidentialism’ has stunted the evolution of multi-party democracy. Since political parties are not regarded as vehicles for upward political mobility, party memberships are less attractive. Further compounding the issue, Russia’s parliament cannot reject the appointment of departmental ministers nor summon them, it cannot regulate the military, police nor security service and its does not administer its own financial affairs. Inevitably, as M Steven Fish, a professor of political science at the University of California at Berkley, asserts: “The system of strong-president-weak-legislature animates the growth not of political parties but rather of closed, compact organizations that are skilled at pressuring and bribing officials in executive-branch agencies.” In Russia, corruption has become institutionalized and has spread epidemically.

As for the press and media, essential to any well-functioning democracy, they have been viciously repressed. Despite constitutional guarantees regarding the freedom of information, Kremlin spin doctors actively conceal the truth while cracking down on opposition newspapers, television channels and journalists. In fact, according to a 2009 report by the Committee to Protect Journalists, 17 journalists have been assassinated for anti-government publishing since Putin’s arrival in 2000, much to the irritancy of the general population.

Too make matters worse, the perpetrators of such murders are rarely punished in the court of law for their crimes. The supposed independency of the Russian judiciary is a fallacy, as legal proceedings are frequently manipulated by state authorities.

Take the case of former Hermitage Capital Investment lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky. After uncovering the largest tax fraud scheme by government officials, Magnitsky was himself charged with tax evasion in the fall of 2008. He died in 2009 after 11 months in pretrial detention following an assault after which he was subsequently denied medical care.

What is prompting such extensive misconduct? Wilfredo Pareto, a 19th and 20th century Italian sociologist, in his theory, The Circulation of Elites, asserts that “society is always governed by a small group of men, by an elite, even when it seems to have a completely democratic organization.” Russia is no different.

In the Putin-Medvedev era, Russia’s political and business elite have profited mightily. The country is home to over 60 billionaires, 36 of whom own a quarter of the economy. In fact, according to a 2010 Wikileaks cable, Putin himself has allegedly amassed $40 billion in hidden assets. The reality is a legitimate democracy could threaten their standing; they have too much to lose. Thus, there is strong incentive to rig elections, obstruct legal proceedings and repress the media in an effort to maintain the status quo, even if it is at the expense of the population.

In an attempt to quell the chaos, President Medvedev has ordered an investigation into the charges of parliamentary electoral fraud. Yet, with the promise of more protests, the Russian people, for the first time since the fall of communism and only the second time since the Russian Revolution of 1917, are mobilizing en masse at the grassroots level. Will it bring about the desired political change? Only time will tell.

Nick Kaminsky is a fourth-year student of political studies at the University of Prince Edward Island. hairy woman hairy girl https://zp-pdl.com/apply-for-payday-loan-online.php https://zp-pdl.com/best-payday-loans.php займ онлайн на карту без отказа