Avenging a whistleblower

European Voice

The passage of the ‘Magnitsky list’ puts the US back on the moral high ground. What does ‘eastern Europe’ think about the new American administration? That was the question that CEPA, a Washington, DC think-tank where I am a non-resident fellow, set me last month.

My answer was “not much”. For a start, I argued that the idea of a homogenous ‘east European’ region of ardent Atlanticists is out of date. Only Poland and Estonia pay their real dues to NATO (spending 2% of gross domestic product on defence). They and a few other countries still have specific expectations of US military involvement in Europe, exemplified by NATO’s contingency planning and next year’s Steadfast Jazz exercise. This will defend a fictitious chunk of NATO from a fictitious adversary. It just happens to take place mostly in Poland and the Baltic states. But most countries when they think about the US do so as Europeans, not as ‘ex-communist countries’. Just like most Europeans, they want the US to be strong and friendly.

But expectations are modest. After 1989, the US was the single most important country for newly free Europe. Not any more. For those in search of an economic and political model, the Nordic countries offer the best example of dynamic capitalism and high-quality public services. The US is a friend, but for the most part a far-away and distracted one.

I pooh-poohed the US’s role a bit prematurely. It is true that the administration is not greatly focused on Europe. But the US is more than the administration. Congress has put the US back on the moral high ground, by passing a law containing the ‘Magnitsky list’.

For those who do not know the story, Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian lawyer who uncovered a $230 million (€178m) fraud perpetrated by Russian officials against their own taxpayers, using some companies looted from Hermitage Capital, a hedge fund run by the American-born financier Bill Browder. Magnitsky was arrested on trumped-up charges and died after a year of pre-trial detention in dreadful conditions. Browder has been lobbying to have the 60 people he says are involved in the fraud, the cover-up and the death of Magnitsky banned from entering foreign countries; he also wants their assets frozen.

The US administration argued hard against the Magnitsky bill (which has formed part of a wider package of trade-liberalisation measures necessitated by Russian membership of the World Trade Organization). But it failed. American lawmakers were moved by the story of a whistleblower being, in effect, executed for his bravery. They also dislike the way that the administration has seemed to kow-tow to the Kremlin since the misbegotten ‘re-set’ in relations.

Putting the Magnitsky list into law has two effects. One is to create, for the first time, a public sanction against Russian kleptocrats and bullies. It is worth noting, incidentally, that Russians themselves strongly favour these sanctions: they are the greatest victims of the regime’s thievery and violence. It is one thing for a Russian official to have some difficulties in getting a visa. That can often be sorted out with a bit of lobbying. But public naming and shaming is another matter entirely. So too are asset freezes. Few of those who make money in Russia want to keep it there. Knowing that it is at risk of seizure abroad is a big worry.

Perhaps even more important, though, is the precedent that the US has set. Browder is now bringing his formidable campaign to Europe. Officials and politicians have tried to fob off his arguments by saying that public sanctions are impractical or illegal. But if the US can do it, why can’t we?

Edward Lucas edits the international section of The Economist. займ на карту срочно без отказа займ на карту без отказов круглосуточно https://www.zp-pdl.com https://zp-pdl.com/emergency-payday-loans.php срочный займ